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Abstract
Recent advances in Fourier analysis have brought new tools
to efficiently represent and learn set functions. In this paper,
we bring the power of Fourier analysis to the design of itera-
tive combinatorial auctions. The key idea is to approximate
the bidders’ value functions using Fourier-sparse set func-
tions, which can be computed using a relatively small number
of queries. Since this number is still too large for real-world
auctions, we propose a novel hybrid auction design: we first
use neural networks to learn bidders values and then apply
Fourier analysis to those learned representations. On a tech-
nical level, we formulate a Fourier transform-based winner
determination problem and derive its mixed integer program
formulation. Based on this, we devise an iterative mechanism
that asks Fourier-based queries. Our experimental evaluation
shows that our hybrid auction leads to a fairer distribution of
social welfare among bidders and significantly reduces run-
time, while matching the economic efficiency of state-of-the-
art auction designs. With this paper, we are the first to lever-
age Fourier analysis in combinatorial auction design and lay
the foundation for future work in this area.
1 Introduction
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) are used to allocate multiple
heterogeneous items to bidders. CAs are particularly useful
in domains where bidders’ preferences exhibit complemen-
tarities and substitutabilities as they allow bidders to submit
bids on bundles of items rather than on individual items.
Because the space of bundles grows exponentially in the
number of items, it is impossible for bidders to report values
for all bundles in settings with more than a modest number
of items. Thus the design of a parsimonious preference elic-
itation is important for the practical design of CAs.
For general value functions, Nisan and Segal (2006) have
shown that to achieve full efficiency in a CA, exponential
communication in the number of items is needed in the worst
case. Therefore, practical CA designs cannot provide effi-
ciency guarantees in large domains. Instead, recent propos-
als for CAs have focused on iterative combinatorial auctions
(ICAs) where the auctioneer interacts with bidders over mul-
tiple rounds, eliciting a limited amount of information, aim-
ing to find a highly efficient allocation.
ICAs have found widespread application in practice
(Ausubel and Cramton 2011; Cramton 2013). For example,
for the sale of spectrum licenses, the combinatorial clock
auction (CCA) (Ausubel, Cramton, and Milgrom 2006) has
generated billions of dollars in total revenue over the past
few years (Ausubel and Baranov 2017). Therefore, increas-
ing the efficiency of such real-world ICAs by only 1–2%
points translates into monetary gains of millions of dollars.
1.1 Machine Learning-based Auction Design
Recently, researchers have successfully used machine learn-
ing (ML) to improve the performance of CAs. Early work
by Blum et al. (2004) and Lahaie and Parkes (2004) laid
the foundation for this by studying the relationship between
computational learning theory and preference elicitation in
CAs. Du¨tting et al. (2019) and Rahme et al. (2020) used
neural networks (NNs) to learn auction mechanisms from
data, following the automated mechanism design paradigm.
Brero, Lahaie, and Seuken (2019) introduced a Bayesian
ICA using probabilistic price updates to achieve faster con-
vergence. Most related to the present paper is the work by
Brero, Lubin, and Seuken (2017; 2018; 2020), who devel-
oped a value-query-based ML-powered ICA using support
vector regressions (SVRs) that achieves even higher effi-
ciency than the CCA. In follow-up work, Weissteiner and
Seuken (2020) extended their mechanism to NNs, further
increasing the efficiency. However, especially in large do-
mains, it remains a challenge to find the efficient allocation
while keeping the elicitation cost for bidders low. Therefore,
even state-of-the-art approaches suffer from significant effi-
ciency losses and often result in unfair allocations, highlight-
ing the need for better preference elicitation algorithms.
1.2 Combining Fourier Analysis and CAs
The goal of preference elicitation in CAs is to learn bid-
ders’ value functions using only a small number of queries.
Mathematically, value functions are set functions, which are
in general exponentially large objects that are notoriously
hard to represent or learn. In this paper, we leverage Fourier
analysis for set functions (Bernasconi, Codenotti, and Si-
mon 1996; O’Donnell 2014; Pu¨schel 2018) to control for
this complexity. In particular, we consider Fourier-sparse
approximations, which are represented by a small number of
parameters. These parameters are the non-zero Fourier coef-
ficients (FCs) obtained by a base change with the Fourier
transform (FT). We use the framework by Pu¨schel and
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Wendler (2020), which contains new FTs beyond the clas-
sical Walsh-Hadamard transform (WHT) (Bernasconi, Co-
denotti, and Simon 1996), providing additional flexibility.
Until recently, methods for learning Fourier-sparse set
functions were focused solely on the WHT, and they placed
assumptions on bidders’ value functions that are too restric-
tive for large CAs. For example, the method by Stobbe and
Krause (2012) requires a superset of the non-zero FCs to be
known and the method by Scheibler, Haghighatshoar, and
Vetterli (2015) places uniform randomness assumptions on
the non-zero FCs and their positions.
However, recently Amrollahi et al. (2019) proposed a
novel algorithm that can approximate general set functions
by WHT-sparse ones. Thus, it is suitable for large CAs and
we use it in this work.
1.3 Our Contribution
Our main contribution in this paper is to bring the power of
Fourier analysis to CA design. In particular, we formulate
FT-based winner determination problems (WDPs) and de-
rive associated mixed integer programs (MIPs) for the vari-
ous notions of FTs. Our MIPs allow for the efficient solution
of the FT-based WDP. Thus, they provide the foundation for
using Fourier-sparse approximations in auction design.
We first show experimentally that the WHT performs best
among the FTs in terms of reconstruction error. As an initial
approach to leveraging the WHT, we develop a WHT-based
allocation rule. However, this requires too many (several
thousand) queries for direct use in CAs. To overcome this
issue, we propose a practical hybrid ICA mechanism based
on NNs and Fourier analysis. The key idea is to compute
Fourier-sparse approximations of NN-based bidder repre-
sentations, enabling us to keep the number of queries small.
Our experiments show that our hybrid ICA matches
the economic efficiency of state-of-the-art mechanisms, but
yields a significant computational speedup and fairer alloca-
tions. Overall, our results show that leveraging Fourier anal-
ysis in CA design is a promising new research direction.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we present our formal model and review the
ML-based ICA by Brero, Lubin, and Seuken (2020).
2.1 Formal Model for ICAs
We consider a CA with n bidders and m indivisible items.
Let N := {1, . . . , n} and M := {1, . . . ,m} denote the set
of bidders and items, respectively. We denote with x ∈ X :=
{0, 1}m a bundle of items represented as an indicator vector,
where xj = 1 iff item j ∈M is contained in x. Bidders’ true
preferences over bundles are represented by their (private)
value functions vi : X → R+, i ∈ N , i.e., vi(x) represents
bidder i’s true value for bundle x.
By a := (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Xn we denote an alloca-
tion of bundles to bidders, where ai is the bundle bid-
der i obtains. We denote the set of feasible allocations
by F := {a ∈ Xn :∑i∈N aij ≤ 1, ∀j ∈M}. The (true)
social welfare of an allocation a is defined as V (a) :=
∑
i∈N vi(ai). We let a
∗ ∈ argmaxa∈F V (a) be a social-
welfare maximizing, i.e., efficient, allocation. The efficiency
of any a ∈ F is measured in terms of a∗ by V (a)/V (a∗).
An ICA mechanism defines how the bidders interact with
the auctioneer and how the final allocation and payments
are determined. We denote a bidder’s (possibly untruthful)
reported value function by vˆi : X → R+. In this paper,
we consider ICAs that ask bidders to iteratively report their
values vˆi(x) for particular bundles x selected by the mech-
anism. A finite set of such reported bundle-value pairs of
bidder i is denoted as Ri :=
{(
x(l), vˆi(x
(l))
)}
, x(l) ∈ X .
Let R := (R1, . . . , Rn) denote the tuple of reported bundle-
value pairs obtained from all bidders and let R−i :=
(R1, . . . , Ri−1, Ri+1, . . . , Rn). We define the reported so-
cial welfare of an allocation a given R as
V̂ (a|R) :=
∑
i∈N : (ai,vˆi(ai))∈Ri
vˆi(ai), (1)
where the condition (ai, vˆi(ai)) ∈ Ri ensures that only val-
ues for reported bundles contribute to the sum. Finally, the
optimal allocation a∗R ∈ F given reports R is defined as
a∗R ∈ argmax
a∈F
V̂ (a|R). (2)
In the mechanisms we consider in this paper, the final
outcome is only computed based on the reported values R.
Specifically, the mechanism determines an allocation a∗R ∈F and charges payments p = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ Rn+. We as-
sume that bidders have quasilinear utilities.
As the auctioneer can generally only ask each bidder i
for a limited number of bundle-value pairs Ri (e.g., 500),
the mechanism needs a sophisticated preference elicitation
algorithm, with the goal of finding a highly efficient alloca-
tion with a limited number of value queries. More formally:
given a cap κ on the number of value queries in an ICA,
elicit from each bidder i ∈ N a set of reported bundle-value
pairs Ri with |Ri| ≤ κ such that the resulting efficiency of
a∗R is maximized, i.e.,R ∈ argmaxR:|Ri|≤κ V (a∗R)/V (a∗) .
2.2 A Machine Learning powered ICA
We now review the machine learning-powered combina-
torial auction (MLCA) introduced by Brero, Lubin, and
Seuken (2020). Instead of using SVRs as the ML algorithm,
we describe MLCA using NNs Ni (a variation introduced
by Weissteiner and Seuken (2020)).
At the core of MLCA is a query module (Algorithm 1),
which, for each bidder i ∈ I , determines a new value query
qi. First, in the estimation step (Line 1), NNs are used to
learn bidders’ valuations from reports Ri. Next, in the opti-
mization step (Line 2), a NN-based WDP is solved to find a
candidate q of queries. See Weissteiner and Seuken (2020)
for details on the NN-based estimation and optimization
step. Finally, if qi has already been queried before (Lines
4–8), another, more restricted, NN-based WDP (Line 6) is
solved and qi is updated. This ensures that all final queries
q are new. In Algorithm 2, we present MLCA in a slightly
abbreviated form. MLCA proceeds in rounds until a maxi-
mum number of queries per bidder Qmax is reached. In each
Algorithm 1: NN-QUERY MODULE (Brero et al. 2020)
Function : NextQueries(I, R)
Inputs : Index set of bidders I and reported values R
Parameters: Neural networksNi : X → R+, i ∈ N
1 foreach i ∈ I do FitNi on Ri:Ni[Ri] . Estimation step
2 Solve q ∈ argmax
a∈F
∑
i∈I
Ni[Ri](ai) . Optimization step
3 foreach i ∈ I do
4 if qi ∈ Ri then . Bundle already queried
5 Define F ′ := {a ∈ F : ai 6= x,∀x ∈ Ri}
6 Resolve q′ ∈ argmaxa∈F′
∑
l∈I Nl[Rl](al)
7 Update qi = q′i
8 end
9 end
10 return profile of new queries q = (q1, . . . , qn)
round, it calls Algorithm 1 n times: once including all bid-
ders (Line 6, main economy) and n− 1 times excluding one
bidder (Lines 7–9, marginal economies). At the end of each
round, the mechanism receives reports Rnew from all bidders
for the newly generated queries qnew, and updates the overall
elicited reports R (Lines 10–12). In Lines 15–16, MLCA
computes an allocation a∗R that maximizes the reported so-
cial welfare and determines VCG payments p (see the tech-
nical appendix Section A.1 for details on p).
Brero, Lubin, and Seuken (2020) argue that MLCA, while
not strategyproof, provides good incentives for bidders to re-
port truthfully. Their incentive analysis also applies to the
hybrid ICA we propose in Section 6.1. These arguments not
withstanding, mechanisms only have access to bidders’ re-
ported value functions vˆi not their true function vi, and we
therefore maintain this distinction in our notation.
Algorithm 2: MLCA (Brero et al. 2020)
Params: Qinit, Qmax initial and max #queries per bidder
1 foreach i ∈ N do
2 Randomly draw initial reports Ri with |Ri| = Qinit
3 end
4 Set t = 1
5 while t ≤ b(Qmax −Qinit)/nc do . Round iterator
6 qnew ←NextQueries(N,R) . Main economy queries
7 foreach bidder i ∈ N do . Marginal economy queries
8 qnew ← NextQueries(N \ {i}, R−i)
9 end
10 foreach bidder i ∈ N do
11 Receive reports Rnewi for q
new
i , set Ri = Ri ∪Rnewi
12 end
13 t = t+ 1
14 end
15 Given elicited reports R compute a∗R as in (2)
16 Given elicited reports R compute VCG-payments p
17 return final allocation a∗R and payments p
3 Fourier Analysis of Value Functions
In this section, we show how to apply Fourier analysis to
bidders’ value functions and provide the theoretical founda-
tion of Fourier transform-based WDPs.
Classic Fourier analysis decomposes an audio signal or
image into an orthogonal set of sinusoids of different fre-
quencies. Similarly, the classical Fourier analysis for set
functions (i.e., functions mapping each subset of a discrete
set to a scalar) decomposes a set function into an orthogonal
set of Walsh functions (Bernasconi, Codenotti, and Simon
1996; O’Donnell 2014), which are piecewise constant with
values 1 and -1 only. Recent work by Pu¨schel and Wendler
(2020) extends the Fourier analysis for set functions with
several novel forms of set Fourier transforms (FTs). Impor-
tantly, because bidders’ value functions are set functions,
they are amenable to this type of Fourier analysis, and it is
this connection that we will leverage in our auction design.
Sparsity. The motivation behind our approach is that we
expect bidders’ value functions to be sparse, meaning that
their preferences can be described with much less data than
is contained in the (exponentially-sized) full value func-
tion. While this sparsity may be difficult to uncover when
looking at bidders’ value reports, it may reveal itself in the
Fourier domain (where then most Fourier coefficients (FCs)
are zero). As all FTs are changes of basis, each FT provides
us with a new lens on the bidder’s value function, potentially
revealing structure and thus reducing dimensionality.
Set function Fourier transform. We now provide a for-
mal description of FTs for reported value functions vˆi. To do
so, we represent vˆi as a vector (vˆi(x))x∈X . Specializing to
transforming such vˆi, all known FTs can be represented by
a certain matrix F ∈ {−1, 0, 1}2m×2m with the form:
φvˆi(y) = (F vˆi)(y) =
∑
x∈X
Fy,xvˆi(x). (3)
The corresponding inverse transform F−1 is thus:
vˆi(x) = (F
−1φvˆi)(x) =
∑
y∈X
F−1x,yφvˆi(y). (4)
We call φvˆi(y) ∈ R the Fourier coefficient at fre-
quency y. Formally, a value function is Fourier-sparse if
| supp(φvˆi)| = |{y ∈ X : φvˆi(y) 6= 0}|  2m. We call
supp(φvˆi) the Fourier support of vˆi.
Classically, the WHT is used as F (Bernasconi, Code-
notti, and Simon 1996), but we also consider two recently in-
troduced FTs (FT3, FT4) due to their information-theoretic
interpretation given in Pu¨schel and Wendler (2020):
FT3: Fy,x = (−1)|x|Imin(x,y)=x, (5)
FT4: Fy,x = (−1)|min(x,y)|Imax(x,y)=1m , (6)
WHT: Fy,x =
1
2m
(−1)|min(x,y)|. (7)
Here, min is the elementwise minimum (intersection of
sets), max analogous, | · | is the set size, 1m denotes the
m-dimensional vector of 1s, and the indicator function IP is
equal to 1 if the predicate P is true and 0 otherwise.
Notions of Fourier-sparsity. The notion of Fourier-
sparsity has gained considerable attention in recent years,
leading to highly efficient algorithms to compute FTs (Sto-
bbe and Krause 2012; Amrollahi et al. 2019; Anonymous
2020). Further, many important classes of set functions are
known to be Fourier-sparse including (hyper)graph cuts,
hypergraph valuations, and decision trees (Abraham et al.
2012) and can thus be learned efficiently. The benefit of
considering multiple FTs is that they offer different, non-
equivalent notions of sparsity.
Example and interpretation. Consider the set of items
M := {1, 2, 3} and the associated reported value function
vˆi shown below (where we use 001 as a shorthand notation
for (0, 0, 1)), together with the corresponding FCs φvˆi :
000 100 010 001 110 101 011 111
vˆi 0 1 1 1 3 3 3 5
FT3 0 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1
FT4 5 -2 -2 -2 0 0 0 1
WHT 17/8 -7/8 -7/8 -7/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8
This bidder exhibits complementary effects for each bundle
containing more than one item, as can be seen, e.g., from
3 = vˆi(110) > vˆi(100) + vˆi(010) = 2 and 5 = vˆi(111) >
vˆi(100) + vˆi(010) + vˆi(001) = 3. Observe that while this
value function is sparse in FT4, i.e., φvˆi(110) = φvˆi(101) =
φvˆi(011) = 0, it is neither sparse in FT3 nor WHT. Note that
the coefficients φvˆi(100), φvˆi(010), and φvˆi(001) capture
the value of single items and thus cannot be zero.
Fourier-sparse approximations. In practice, vˆi may only
be approximately sparse. However, it may still be approx-
imated well by a small, carefully chosen subset of coeffi-
cients. Formally, if Si ⊆ supp(φvˆi) with |Si| = k, we call
v˜i(x) :=
∑
y∈Si
F−1x,yφvˆi(y) for all x ∈ X (8)
a k-Fourier-sparse approximation of vˆi. We denote the cor-
responding vector of FCs by φvˆi|Si := (φvˆi(y))y∈Si .
4 Fourier Transform-based WDPs
To leverage Fourier analysis for auction design, we repre-
sent bidders’ reported value functions using Fourier-sparse
approximations. An important step in most auction designs
is to find the social welfare-maximizing allocation given bid-
der’s reports, which is known as the Winner Determination
Problem (WDP). Thus, to apply FT in such mechanisms, we
need to be able to solve the WDP efficiently. Accordingly,
we next derive MIP formulations for each of the FTs.
For each bidder i ∈ N let v˜i : X → R+ be the Fourier-
sparse approximation of the bidder’s reported value function
vˆi. Next, we define the Fourier transform-based WDP.
Definition 1. (FOURIER TRANSFORM-BASED WDP)
argmax
a∈F
∑
i∈N
v˜i(ai). (FT-WDP)
For all x, y ∈ Rd, let x ≤ y, max(x, y) and (−1)x be
defined componentwise, and let 〈·, ·〉 denote the Euclidean
scalar product. First, we formulate succinct representations
of v˜i for all considered FTs.
Lemma 1. (SUCCINCT REPRESENTATIONS) For i ∈ N let
Si = {y(1), . . . , y(k)} be the support of a k-Fourier-sparse
approximation v˜i and let Wi ∈ {0, 1}k×m be defined as:
(Wi)l,j :=
{
1 if y(l)j = 1,
0 otherwise.
(9)
Then v˜i can be rewritten for the different FTs as
FT3: v˜i(x) =
〈
φvˆi|Si ,max (0k, 1k−Wi(1m−x))
〉
(10)
FT4: v˜i(x) =
〈
φvˆi|Si ,max (0k, 1k −Wix)
〉
(11)
WHT: v˜i(x) =
〈
φvˆi|Si , (−1)Wix
〉
. (12)
The proof of Lemma 1 follows by rewriting the respective
FTs from Pu¨schel and Wendler (2020) using indicator nota-
tion. Please see the technical appendix Section B.1 for the
details. Using Lemma 1 and rewriting max(·, ·) and (−1)·
as linear constraints, we can formulate (FT-WDP) as a MIP.
Theorem 1. (FOURIER TRANSFORM-BASED MIPS) Let
v˜i : X → R be a k-Fourier-sparse approximation as defined
in (10), (11), or (12). Then there exists a constant C > 0
such that the MIP defined by the following objective
argmax
a∈F,βi∈{0,1}k
∑
i∈N
〈φvˆi|Si , αi〉, (13)
and for i ∈ N one set of transform specific constraints (14)–
(16), or (17)–(19), or (20)–(22), is equivalent to (FT-WDP).
FT3: s.t. αi ≥ 1k −Wi(1m − ai) (14)
αi ≤ 1k −Wi(1m − ai) + Cβi (15)
0k ≤ αi ≤ C(1k − βi) (16)
FT4: s.t. αi ≥ 1k −Wiai (17)
αi ≤ 1k −Wiai + Cβi (18)
0k ≤ αi ≤ C(1k − βi) (19)
WHT: s.t. αi = −2βi + 1k (20)
βi =Wiai − 2γi (21)
γi ∈ Zk (22)
Please see the technical appendix Section B.2 for a proof
of Theorem 1. Using Theorem 1, we can solve (FT-WDP)
for all FTs using standard MIP-solvers like CPLEX.1
5 Analyzing the Potential of a FT-based CA
In this section, we experimentally evaluate the FTs and pro-
pose an FT-based allocation rule that motivates our practical
hybrid ICA mechanism presented later in Section 6.
For our experiments, we use the spectrum auction test
suite (SATS) version 0.6.4 (Weiss, Lubin, and Seuken 2017).
SATS enables us to generate synthetic CA instances in dif-
ferent domains. Furthermore, we have access to each bid-
der’s true full value function vi as well as the efficient al-
location a∗ ∈ F . When simulating bidders in our exper-
iments, we assume straightforward truthful bidding (i.e.,
vˆi = vi, for all i ∈ N ). We consider three domains:
The Global Synergy Value Model (GSVM) (Goeree and
Holt 2010) has 18 items, 6 regional and 1 national bidder.
The Local Synergy Value Model (LSVM) (Scheffel,
Ziegler, and Bichler 2012) consists of 5 regional bidders, 1
national bidder and 18 items. Complementarities arise from
spatial proximity of items.
The Multi-Region Value Model (MRVM) (Weiss, Lubin,
and Seuken 2017) consists of 98 items and 10 bidders, cat-
egorized as national, regional, or local. It models large US
and Canadian spectrum auctions.
1In our experiments we use CPLEX 12.10.0.0.
Domain k Bidder FT3 FT4 WHT NN
GSVM
50 Nat. 37.8± 1.7 43.7± 1.8 4.3± 0.2 14.7± 0.9Reg. 18.7± 1.6 29.7± 2.2 3.8± 0.3 10.8± 2.0
100 Nat. 11.3± 0.7 14.2± 0.8 1.8± 0.1 9.0± 1.8Reg. 0.0± 0.0 1.4± 0.2 0.4± 0.1 7.2± 0.9
200 Nat. 0.0± 0.0 0.0± 0.0 0.0± 0.0 5.7± 0.4Reg. 0.0± 0.0 0.0± 0.0 0.0± 0.0 5.2± 0.8
LSVM
50 Nat. 74.7± 0.9 342.6± 5.1 36.6± 0.5 67.6± 2.1Reg. 27.3± 1.8 48.7± 2.2 9.2± 0.4 22.6± 1.2
100 Nat. 78.4± 1.0 580.2± 7.9 31.2± 0.4 48.7± 1.2Reg. 28.2± 2.3 48.5± 2.7 6.8± 0.3 17.8± 0.7
200 Nat. 95.8± 1.2 639.0± 10.0 26.2± 0.3 40.6± 0.7Reg. 25.8± 2.0 43.1± 2.4 5.3± 0.3 15.3± 0.9
Table 1: Reconstruction error of k-Fourier sparse approxi-
mations v˜i and NNs trained on k randomly selected bundles.
Winner models are colored in blue.2
5.1 Reconstruction Error of Fourier Transforms
We first validate the FT approach by comparing the re-
construction error of the FTs in the medium-sized domains
GSVM and LSVM, where we can still compute the full FT
(in contrast to MRVM). For now, we assume that we have ac-
cess to bidders’ full reported value functions. In Procedure 1,
we determine the best k-Fourier-sparse approximation v˜i.
Procedure 1. (BEST FCS GIVEN FULL ACCESS TO vˆi)
Compute all FCs by using the full FT for each bidders’ re-
ported value function φvˆi = F vˆi. Next, determine the k best
FCs φvˆi|Si in terms of quadratic error ‖vˆi− v˜i‖22 as follows:
i. WHT: use the FCs with the k largest absolute values.
ii. FT3 and FT4: use the FCs with the k largest coefficients
|φvˆi(y)|‖F−1·,y ‖2, where F−1·,y denotes the yth column.
We provide details for i. and ii. in the technical appendix
Section C. Using v˜i, we then calculate the reconstruction
RMSE ( 12m
∑
x∈X (vˆi(x) − v˜i(x))2)1/2 averaged over 100
instances and bidders of the same type. In Table 1, we
present the RMSEs with a 95%-confidence interval for the
three FTs. Furthermore, we present the RMSE for NNs,
where we used the same architectures as reported in Weis-
steiner and Seuken (2020) and trained them on k random
bundle-value pairs.
For GSVM, we observe that we can perfectly reconstruct
vˆi with the 200 best FCs, which shows that GSVM is 200-
sparse. In contrast, LSVM is non-sparse, and we do not
achieve perfect reconstruction with 200 FCs. Overall, we ob-
serve that the WHT outperforms FT3 and FT4. Moreover,
wee see that, if we could compute the k best FCs of the
WHT from k training points, the WHT would outperform
the NNs. However, when designing a practical ICA we do
not have access to full value functions. Instead, we must use
an algorithm that computes the best FCs using queries.
5.2 A Fourier Transform-based Allocation Rule
We now present a first simple FT-based allocation rule us-
ing the robust sparse WHT algorithm (RWHT) by Amrollahi
2Note, due to the difference in training methodology, the NN
results in Table 1 are only meant as a reference point.
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Figure 1: Efficiency of Procedure 2 in GSVM.
et al. (2019) and evaluate its efficiency in GSVM. RWHT
learns a Fourier-sparse approximation v˜i of vˆi from queries.
We use Procedure 2 to determine an allocation a˜.
Procedure 2. (WHT-BASED ALLOCATION RULE)
i. Estimation: For each bidder i, compute a k-Fourier-
sparse approximation v˜i from queries using RWHT.
ii. Optimization: Solve a˜∈ argmax
a∈F
∑
i∈N
v˜i(ai) by Theorem 1.
In Figure 1, we present the efficiency of a˜ on 50 GSVM
instances for various values of k. We observe that RWHT
achieves a median efficiency of 100% when using 90 or
more FCs. Nevertheless, the main practical issue with this
approach is the number of value queries required (printed on
the top of Figure 1). As we can see, RWHT needs 102, 000
value queries (around 39% of all bundles) to find the 90 best
FCs. For a practical ICA mechanism this is far too many.
6 A Practical Hybrid ICA Mechanism
In this section, we introduce and experimentally evaluate a
practical hybrid ICA mechanism, based on FTs and NNs.
6.1 The Hybrid ICA Mechanism
The main issue of the FT-based allocation rule in Section 5.2
is the large number of queries, which we now address.
The key idea is the following: instead of directly applying
a sparse FT algorithm (like RWHT) to reported value func-
tions, we apply it to a NN-based (learned) representation.
In this way, we evaluate NNs instead of querying the bid-
ders. Based on the FCs of the NNs, we determine a Fourier-
sparse approximation v˜i using only few value queries, where
the idea is that the FCs of each NN concentrate on the most
dominant FCs of its corresponding value function.
We first present an overview of our hybrid ICA mech-
anism, leaving the details of individual sub-procedures to
Section 6.2.
HYBRID ICA (see Algorithm 3) consists of four phases:
(1) the initialization phase, (2) the MLCA phase, (3) the
Fourier reconstruction phase, and (4) the Fourier alloca-
tion phase. It is parameterized by an FT F and the num-
bers `1, `2, `3, `4 of different value queries. In total, HYBRID
ICA asks each bidder `1 random initial queries, `2 MLCA
Algorithm 3: HYBRID ICA
Params: F Fourier transform; `1, `2, `3, `4 query split
1 Set Qinit := `1 . Initialization phase
2 Set Qmax := `1 + `2 . MLCA phase
3 Run MLCA(Qinit, Qmax) and elicit `2 reports R
4 foreach bidder i ∈ N do . Fourier Reconstr. phase
5 Fit NNNi to Ri . Learn NN-based representation
6 Determine the best FCs ofNi . (Proc. 3)
7 Determine `3 reconstruction queries S˜i . (Proc. 4)
8 Ask S˜i and add reports to Ri . Four. recon. queries
9 Fit Fourier-sparse approximation v˜i to Ri . (Proc. 5)
10 end
11 for l = 1, . . . , `4 do . Fourier alloc. phase (Proc. 6)
12 Solve q ∈ argmaxa∈F
∑
i∈N v˜i(ai) (FT-WDP)
13 foreach bidder i ∈ N do
14 if qi ∈ Ri then . Bundle already queried
15 Define F ′ := {a ∈ F : ai 6= x, ∀x ∈ Ri}
16 Resolve q′ ∈ argmaxa∈F′
∑
i∈N v˜i(ai)
17 Update qi = q′i
18 end
19 Query bidder i’s value for qi and add report to Ri
20 Fit Fourier-sparse approx. v˜i to Ri . (Proc. 5)
21 end
22 end
23 Given elicited reports R compute allocation: a∗R as in (2)
24 Given elicited reports R compute VCG payments p
25 return final allocation a∗R and VCG payments p
allocation queries, `3 Fourier reconstruction queries, and `4
Fourier allocation queries (= `1 + `2 + `3 + `4 queries).
In the initialization phase, we generate `1 random initial
bundle-value pairs (Line 1). Next, in the MLCA phase, we
run MLCA using these initial bundles and elicit `2 MLCA
allocation queries (Lines 2–3). In Line 5, we fit for each
bidder a NN Ni on the reports Ri. We incorporate MLCA
here, so that the NNs are trained on “meaningfully” elicited
reports Ri, rather than just on the `1 random initial queries.
In the Fourier reconstruction phase, we compute a Fourier-
sparse approximation v˜i. Here, we first compute the best FCs
of the fitted NNs (Line 6, Procedure 3). Then, based on the
FCs, we determine `3 Fourier reconstruction queries S˜i ⊆
X (Lines 7, Procedure 4), which we then send to the bidders
to receive reports (Line 8). Finally, we fit v˜i to the reportsRi
received so far (Line 9, Procedure 5).
In the last phase, the Fourier allocation phase, we use
the fitted Fourier-sparse approximations v˜i to generate `4
Fourier allocation queries (Procedure 6). Here, we solve
the FT-based WDP (Line 12) to determine a candidate q of
value queries, ensure in Lines 14–18 that all queries are new,
and add the received reports to Ri (Line 19).
Finally, based on all reports R, HYBRID ICA outputs an
allocation a∗R that maximizes the reported social welfare and
VCG payments p (see the technical appendix Section A.1).
6.2 Fourier Transform-based Procedures
We now present the FT-based procedures of Hybrid ICA (for
details see the technical appendix Section D.1.).
In Line 6, we use Procedure 3 to compute best FCs of the
NN-based representations.
Procedure 3. (BEST FCS OF NEURAL NETWORKS)
i. If m ≤ 29 : calculate the full FT of the NNs and select the
best FCs via Procedure 1.
ii. If m > 29 : use sparse FT algorithms, i.e., RWHT for
WHT and SSFT (Anonymous 2020) for FT3 and FT4 to
obtain the best FCs of the NNs.3
In Line 7, we call Procedure 4 to determine `3 Fourier re-
construction queries based on the best FCs of the NNs.
Procedure 4. (FOURIER RECONSTRUCTION QUERIES)
i. FT3 and FT4: use the sampling theorems by Pu¨schel and
Wendler (2020) to determine queries for the bidders, i.e.,
bundles S˜i ⊆ X , that enable a reconstruction of v˜i.
ii. WHT: use the same queries as for FT4.4
We use Procedure 5 to fit the FCs φvˆi|Si of the Fourier-
sparse approximation v˜i to received reports Ri (Line 9).
Procedure 5. (FIT FOURIER-SPARSE v˜i TO REPORTS)
i. FT3 and FT4: solve the least squares problem defined by
the best FCs and reports Ri.
ii. WHT: use the compressive sensing method by Stobbe and
Krause (2012) defined by the best FCs and reports Ri.
Procedure 6 generates `4 Fourier allocation queries.
Procedure 6. (FOURIER ALLOCATION QUERY)
i. Given fitted v˜i, use the MIPs from Theorem 1 to determine
a candidate allocation q (Line 12).
ii. Optionally, solve another, more restricted, FT-based WDP
to ensure that the queries qi are new (Lines 14–18).
6.3 Experiments
We now evaluate the efficiency of our HYBRID ICA and
compare it against MLCA in GSVM, LSVM, and MRVM.
Hyperparameter optimization. For both HYBRID ICA
and MLCA, we use the same NN architectures as reported
in Weissteiner and Seuken (2020) and set the same to-
tal query budget of 100 (GSVM and LSVM), and 500
(MRVM). For HYBRID ICA, we performed a hyperparame-
ter optimization on a training set of 100 (GSVM and LSVM)
3Ifm> 29 calculating a full FT is computationally not feasible.
4We use this approach, since for the WHT no sampling theorem
exists, and the WHT can be decomposed into a triangular matrix
and FT4.
NNs Architecture FT `1 `2 `3 `4
GSVM R:[32, 32] | N:[10, 10] WHT 30 21 20 29
LSVM R:[32, 32] | N:[10, 10, 10] WHT 30 30 10 30
MRVM L,R,N:[16, 16] FT4 30 220 100 150
Table 2: Best configuration of HYBRID ICA.
GSVM (sparse) LSVM (non-sparse) MRVM (non-sparse national bidders)
Efficiency Reg. Nat. Rev. hrs/ Efficiency Reg. Nat. Rev. hrs/ Efficiency Lo. Reg. Nat. Rev. hrs/
Mechanism in % in % in % in % Inst. in % in % in % in % Inst. in % in % in % in % in % Inst.
HYBRID ICA 99.59± 0.15 94.34 5.35 80 0.77 98.47± 0.44 88.84 9.62 77 1.89 95.72± 0.43 0.01 1.53 94.18 37 16.28
MLCA 99.17± 0.37 98.11 1.06 79 4.65 99.14± 0.42 93.40 5.75 77 6.09 95.32± 0.32 0.00 0.53 94.79 41 43.26
MLCA+RANDOM 98.16± 0.50 97.47 0.69 75 0.71 97.75± 0.63 92.78 5.27 72 1.86 93.91± 0.36 0.01 0.42 93.48 42 14.68
Efficient Allocation 94.75 5.25 84.03 15.97 0.00 2.11 97.89
Table 3: A comparison of HYBRID ICA against MLCA and MLCA+RANDOM. All results are averages over 100 (GSVM and
LSVM) and 30 (MRVM) instances. For efficiency we give a 95% confidence interval and color the best mechanisms in blue.
and 30 (MRVM) instances, where we optimized the FTs and
tried several query parameters `1, `2, `3, `4. Table 2 presents
the results of the best found HYBRID ICA configuration
for each domain.5 We observe that WHT works best for the
smaller GSVM and LSVM, and FT4 for MRVM.
Experiment Setup. For each domain, we present effi-
ciency, the distribution of efficiency to bidder types, rev-
enue (calculated as (
∑
i∈N pi)/V (a
∗)) and compute time
in hours per instance. To verify the importance of the `3
Fourier reconstruction and the `4 Fourier allocation queries,
we also present a third mechanism MLCA+RANDOM.
MLCA+RANDOM runs the same parametrization as HY-
BRID ICA with the only exception, that it uses random
queries instead of the `3 + `4 Fourier-based queries. Thus,
comparing HYBRID ICA and MLCA+RANDOM isolates
the effect of the Fourier-based queries.
HYBRID ICA vs. MLCA. We now compare the perfor-
mance of HYBRID ICA against MLCA, as shown in Ta-
ble 3.6 First, we see that HYBRID ICA matches the effi-
ciency of MLCA in all domains. However, HYBRID ICA
has two important advantages. First, it leads to a significant
computational speedup (×6 in GSVM, ×3 in LSVM and
MRVM). Second, and most importantly, it distributes the ef-
ficiency more evenly across bidder types. This also leads to
a distribution that more closely resembles the distribution in
the efficient allocation (see Efficient Allocation). Intuitively,
the Fourier-based queries lead to a better exploration of the
bundle space than only using MLCA allocation queries.
Importance of Fourier-based queries. A comparison of
HYBRID ICA to MLCA+RANDOM reveals that the Fourier-
based queries lead to significantly better efficiency. Further-
more, we see that MLCA+RANDOM cannot achieve the
more balanced distribution of efficiency to bidder types.
Details for HYBRID ICA. Figure 2 shows detailed effi-
ciency results for GSVM (for LSVM and MRVM see the
technical appendix Section D.2). We plot the efficiency of
the different phases of HYBRID ICA. Starting with `1 = 30
random initial queries (Rand. Init.), HYBRID ICA achieves
a mean efficiency of 65%. Next, our algorithm performs
three MLCA iterations (MLCA 1–3) to ask `2 = 21 MLCA
allocation queries in total.7 After that, for 99 instances,
HYBRID ICA found an allocation with an efficiency of at
least 90%. However, the remaining Fourier-based queries
5R:[d1, d2, d3] denotes a 3-hidden-layer NN for the regional
bidder type with d1, d2 and d3 hidden nodes, respectively.
6All results are obtained on a test set of new CA instances.
7Recall that MLCA asks each bidder n queries per iteration.
still significantly increase (by 1.4%) the average efficiency
to 99.59%.
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Figure 2: HYBRID ICA in GSVM.
Thus, especially in sparse domains, our Fourier-based ap-
proach might be valuable for the design of real-world ICAs.
In practice, bidders are often either limited by their cognitive
abilities (Scheffel, Ziegler, and Bichler 2012) or use a (low-
dimensional) computational model to represent their value
function. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that their prefer-
ences exhibit only a limited degree of supplementarity and
complementarity, which is captured well by Fourier-sparsity.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced Fourier analysis for the
design of combinatorial auctions and laid the foundations
for future work in this area. The main idea was to repre-
sent bidder’s value functions using Fourier-sparse approxi-
mations, providing us with a new lens on bidder’s values in
the Fourier domain.
On a technical level, our main contribution was to derive
succinct MIPs for the Fourier transform-based WDPs, which
makes computing Fourier-based allocation queries practi-
cally feasible. We have leveraged this to design a new hy-
brid ICA mechanism that uses NN-based and Fourier-based
queries. Our experiments have shown that our approach
matches the economic efficiency of the current benchmark,
while achieving a significant computational speedup and a
fairer distribution of welfare among bidders.
For future work, it would be interesting to investigate how
and why the addition of the Fourier-based queries lead to
a fairer distribution of welfare. Furthermore, one could ex-
plore the application of our techniques in settings where
large amounts of bidding data is available (e.g., in ad auc-
tions), such that the number of queries is no longer a limiting
factor for the application of the Fourier analysis framework.
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Appendix
A Preliminaries
In this section, we provide a recap on how to compute VCG
payments from bidder’s reports.
A.1 VCG Payments from Reports
Let R = (R1, . . . , Rn) denote an elicited set of reported
bundle-value pairs from each bidder obtained from MLCA
(Algorithm 2) or HYBRID ICA (Algorithm 3) and let
R−i := (R1, . . . , Ri−1, Ri+1, . . . , Rn). We then calculate
the VCG payments p = (p1 . . . , pn) ∈ Rn+ as follows:
Definition 2. (VCG PAYMENTS FROM REPORTS)
pj :=
∑
i∈N\{j}
vˆi
((
a∗R−j
)
i
)
−
∑
i∈N\{j}
vˆi ((a
∗
R)i) . (23)
where a∗R−i maximizes the reported social welfare when ex-
cluding bidder i, i.e.,
a∗R−j ∈ argmax
a∈F
V̂ (a|R−j) = argmax
a∈F
∑
i∈N\{j}:
(ai,vˆi(ai))∈Ri
vˆi(ai),
(24)
and a∗R is a reported-social-welfare-maximizing allocation
(including all bidders), i.e,
a∗R ∈ argmax
a∈F
V̂ (a|R) = argmax
a∈F
∑
i∈N : (ai,vˆi(ai))∈Ri
vˆi(ai). (25)
As argued in Brero, Lubin, and Seuken (2020), using such
payments are key for MLCA to induce “good” incentives
for bidders to report truthfully. As their incentive analysis
also applies to HYBRID ICA, we use them in our design
too.
B Fourier Transform-based WDPs
In this Section, we present the proofs of Lemma 1 and The-
orem 1.
Let 1d and 0d for d ∈ N denote the d-dimensional vector
of ones and zeros, respectively. For all x, y ∈ Rd, let x ≤
y, max(x, y), min(x, y) and (−1)x be defined component-
wise, and let 〈·, ·〉 denote the Euclidean scalar product.
We consider the matrix representation F and F−1 of the
considered FTs from Pu¨schel and Wendler (2020) given by:
FT3: Fy,x = (−1)|x|Imin(x,y)=x, (26)
F−1x,y = (−1)|y|Imin(x,y)=y, (27)
FT4: Fy,x = (−1)|min(x,y)|Imax(x,y)=1m , (28)
F−1x,y = Imin(x,y)=0m , (29)
WHT: Fy,x =
1
2m
(−1)|min(x,y)|, (30)
F−1x,y = (−1)|min(x,y)|. (31)
The Fourier-sparse approximations used in the WDPs are
defined in terms of F−1.
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 2. (SUCCINCT REPRESENTATIONS) For i ∈ N let
Si = {y(1), . . . , y(k)} be the support of a k-Fourier-sparse
approximation v˜i and let Wi ∈ {0, 1}k×m be defined as:
(Wi)l,j :=
{
1 if y(l)j = 1,
0 otherwise.
(32)
Then v˜i can be rewritten for the different FTs as
FT3: v˜i(x) =
〈
φvˆi|Si ,max (0k, 1k−Wi(1m−x))
〉
(33)
FT4: v˜i(x) =
〈
φvˆi|Si ,max (0k, 1k −Wix)
〉
(34)
WHT: v˜i(x) =
〈
φvˆi|Si , (−1)Wix
〉
. (35)
Proof. In this proof we are going to make use of the equiva-
lence between bundles (= indicator vectors) and sets. Recall
that x, y ∈ X = {0, 1}m are bundles and bundles corre-
spond to subsets of items. We can translate set operations
such as intersection, union and complement to indicator vec-
tors as follows:
x ∩ y = min(x, y), (36)
x ∪ y = max(x, y), (37)
(x)c = 1m − x, (38)
where we slightly abused notation by identifying the indica-
tor vectors with their corresponding subsets on the left hand
sides of (36)–(38). Furthermore, it holds that:
|min(x, y)| = yTx =
m∑
i=1
xiyi (39)
FT3. Let F denote the matrix representation of FT3 in
(5). Here, we slightly adjust the Fourier basis to our needs by
flipping the signs of the negative basis vectors, i.e., negative
columns (F−1·,y with |y| odd) in F−1. This way we obtain
F˜−1x,y = Imin(x,y)=y . We do so because it does not change the
basis (when computing the corresponding Fourier transform
the signs of respective Fourier coefficients flip) and it makes
the implementation of FT3 more similar to the one of FT4.
After changing the signs of the basis vectors in described
manner, we have
v˜i(x) =
∑
y∈Si
F˜−1x,yφvˆi(y) (40)
=
∑
y∈Si
Imin(1m−x,y)=0mφvˆi(y) (41)
=〈(Imin(1m−x,y)=0m)y∈Si , φvˆi|Si〉, (42)
where we used x ∩ y = y ⇔ xc ∩ y = ∅. Now, the claim
follows by observing that
Imin(1m−x,y)=0m = max
(
0, 1− yT (1m − x
)
), (43)
which is a direct consequence of |min(1m − x, y)| =
yT (1m − x), and recalling that for each y ∈ Si there is a
respective row yT in Wi.
FT4. Let F be the matrix representation of FT4 in (6). By
definition, we have
v˜i(x) =
∑
y∈Si
F−1x,yφvˆi(y) (44)
=
∑
y∈Si
Imin(x,y)=0mφvˆi(y) (45)
=〈(Imin(x,y)=0m)y∈Si , φvˆi|Si〉. (46)
Now, the claim follows by observing that
Imin(x,y)=0m = max
(
0, 1− yTx) , (47)
which is a direct consequence of |min(x, y)| = yTx, and
recalling that for each y ∈ Si there is a respective row yT in
Wi.
WHT. Let F be the matrix representation of WHT in (7).
By definition, we have
v˜i(x) =
∑
y∈Si
F−1x,yφvˆi(y) (48)
=
∑
y∈Si
(−1)yT xφvˆi(y) (49)
=〈((−1)yT x)y∈Si , φvˆi|Si〉. (50)
Now, the claim follows by recalling that for each y ∈ Si
there is a respective row yT in Wi.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 1
We first state and proof two elementary lemmata.
For x ∈ Rd let x (mod 2) be defined component-wise.
Lemma 3. (MAX REPRESENTATION) Let ζ, η ∈ Rd for
d ∈ N and C > 0 such that for all l ∈ {1, . . . , d} it holds
that |ζl − ηl| ≤ C. Let α := max(ζ, η) and consider the
polytope P in (α˜, β) defined by (51)–(55)
α˜ ≥ η (51)
α˜ ≤ η + Cβ (52)
α˜ ≥ ζ (53)
α˜ ≤ ζ + C(1d − β) (54)
β ∈ {0, 1}d. (55)
Then it holds that P 6= ∅ and every element (α˜, β) ∈ P
satisfies α˜ = α.
Proof. Non-emptiness follows from the assumption that
|ζl − ηl| ≤ C for all l ∈ {1, . . . , d}. For any l ∈ {1, . . . , d}
we have to distinguish the following cases:
ζl < ηl =⇒ βl = 0, α˜l = ηl = max(ζl, ηl) = αl
ζl > ηl =⇒ βl = 1, α˜l = ζl = max(ζl, ηl) = αl
ζl = ηl =⇒ α˜l = ζl = ηl = max(ζl, ηl) = αl
This yields that α˜ = α.
Lemma 4. (ODD-EVEN REPRESENTATION) Let ζ ∈ Zd
for d ∈ N. Let β := ζ (mod 2) ∈ {0, 1}d and consider the
polytope P in (β˜, γ) defined by (56) and (57)
β˜ = ζ − 2γ (56)
β˜ ∈ {0, 1}d, γ ∈ Zd. (57)
Then it holds that P 6= ∅ and every element (β˜, γ) ∈ P
satisfies β˜ = β.
Proof. Non-emptiness follows since ζ ∈ Zd per assump-
tion. For any l ∈ {1, . . . , d} we have to distinguish the fol-
lowing cases:
ζl (mod 2) = 0 =⇒ γl = ζ
2
, β˜l = 0 = βl
ζl (mod 2) = 1 =⇒ γl = ζ − 1
2
, β˜l = 1 = βl
Thus β˜ = β.
For each bidder i ∈ N let v˜i : X → R+ be the Fourier-
sparse approximation of the bidder’s reported value function
vˆi. Then the Fourier transform-based WDP was defined as
follows:
Definition 3. (FOURIER TRANSFORM-BASED WDP)
argmax
a∈F
∑
i∈N
v˜i(ai). (FT-WDP)
Next, we proof Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. (FOURIER TRANSFORM-BASED MIPS) Let
v˜i : X → R be a k-Fourier-sparse approximation as defined
in (10), (11), or (12). Then there exists a constant C > 0
such that the MIP defined by the following objective
argmax
a∈F,βi∈{0,1}k
∑
i∈N
〈φvˆi|Si , αi〉, (58)
and for i ∈ N one set of transform specific constraints (59)–
(61), or (62)–(64), or (65)–(67), is equivalent to (FT-WDP).
FT3: s.t. αi ≥ 1k −Wi(1m − ai) (59)
αi ≤ 1k −Wi(1m − ai) + Cβi (60)
0k ≤ αi ≤ C(1k − βi) (61)
FT4: s.t. αi ≥ 1k −Wiai (62)
αi ≤ 1k −Wiai + Cβi (63)
0k ≤ αi ≤ C(1k − βi) (64)
WHT: s.t. αi = −2βi + 1k (65)
βi =Wiai − 2γi (66)
γi ∈ Zk (67)
Proof. We proof the equivalence for each of the FTs and
corresponding MIPs separately.
• FT3
Let C > 0 such that | [1k −Wi(1m − ai)]l | ≤ C for all
l ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i ∈ N , and a ∈ F . We then define
αi := max (0k, 1k −Wi(1m − ai)) for all i ∈ N,
and apply for each αi Lemma 3 to ζ := 0k and
η := 1k −Wi(1m − ai), which concludes the proof for
FT3.
• FT4:
This follows analogously as for the FT3 when defining
αi := max(0k, 1k−Wiai), ζ := 0k and η := 1k−Wiai.
• WHT:
Since for all i ∈ N and a ∈ F it holds that Wiai ∈ Zk,
an immediate consequence from Lemma 4 is that βi =
Wiai (mod 2) and (−1)Wiai = −2βi + 1k, which con-
cludes the proof for the WHT.
C Analyzing the Potential of a FT-based CA
Let F denote the corresponding matrix representation of the
FT3, FT4, or the WHT. Furthermore, fix bidder i ∈ N and
for Si ⊆ supp(φvˆi), |Si| = k  2m let
v˜i =
∑
y∈Si
F−1x,yφvˆi(y) = F
−1
·,Siφvˆi|Si , (68)
be a k-Fourier-sparse approximation, where we denote by
F−1·,Si the sub matrix of F
−1 obtained by selecting the
columns indexed by the bundles in Si.
C.1 Best Fourier Coefficients WHT
For the WHT, we consider the following optimization prob-
lem of selecting the k-best FCs with respect to the quadratic
error:
S∗i ∈ argmin
Si⊆supp(φvˆi ), |Si|=k
‖vˆi − F−1·,Siφvˆi|Si‖22. (69)
Then, it follows that S∗i consists out of those bundles
{y(l)}kl=1 with the largest absolute value of the correspond-
ing FCs {φvˆi(y(l))}kl=1. This can be seen as follows.
‖vˆi − F−1·,Siφvˆi|Si‖22 =‖
∑
y 6∈Si
F−1·,y φvˆi(y)‖22 (70)
=
∑
x,y 6∈Si
〈F−1·,x , F−1·,y 〉φvˆi(x)φvˆi(y) (71)
=
∑
y 6∈Si
φvˆi(y)
2, (72)
where in the last equality we used that F−1 is an orthogonal
matrix and thus its columns fulfill 〈F−1·,x , F−1·,y 〉 = Ix=y .
C.2 Best Fourier Coefficients FT3 and FT4
For FT3 and FT4 , we use the triangular inequality
‖vˆi − F−1·,Siφvˆi|Si‖2 ≤
∑
y 6∈Si
|φvˆi(y)|‖F−1·,y ‖2
to get an upper bound of the quadratic error ‖vˆi −
v˜i‖22 and select the FCs with the k largest coefficients|φvˆi(y)|‖F−1·,y ‖2, whereF−1·,y denotes the yth column ofF−1.
D A Practical Hybrid ICA Mechanism
D.1 Technical Details of HYBRID ICA
In this section we provide the technical details for the im-
plementation of HYBRID ICA. In particular, we explain the
Fourier Transform-based procedures: Procedures 3–5.
Determining the best FCs of NN
Procedure 3. (BEST FCS OF NEURAL NETWORKS)
i. If m ≤ 29 : calculate the full FT of the NNs and select the
best FCs.
ii. If m > 29 : use sparse FT algorithms, i.e., RWHT for
WHT and SSFT (Anonymous 2020) for FT3 and FT4 to
obtain the best FCs of the NNs.
Using Procedure 3 we determine the best FCs of the neural
network estimates of each bidder. We distinguish the two
cases:
• Small number of items: if the number of items is small
enough, i.e., m ≤ 29, we determine the best FCs (and
associated locations Si ⊂ X ) of Ni for all FTs by com-
puting its full Fourier transform FNi = φNi using the
respective algorithms from Pu¨schel and Wendler (2020).
• Large number of items: if the number of items is too
large, i.e., m > 29, we cannot compute the full Fourier
transform and thus require sparse FT algorithms to com-
pute the locations of the best FCs. For the WHT, we can
do so by using the robust sparse WHT algorithm (RWHT)
by Amrollahi et al. (2019). For FT3 and FT4, we use
the sparse set function Fourier transform (SSFT) algo-
rithm by Anonymous (2020). Both algorithms learn the
best FCs as well as their support by only using queries
from the corresponding set function (= a bidder’s value
function), and thus do not require a representation of the
exponentially large full set function.
• Best WHT FCs: for the WHT the best FCs are the ones
with the largest absolute values (see Section C.1). We se-
lect the locations of the c`3 best NN FCs, i.e., |Si| = c`3.
We do so because we are going to use the compressive
sensing method by Stobbe and Krause (2012), which only
requires a superset of the support supp(φvˆi), in Proce-
dure 5 to fit the Fourier-sparse approximations v˜i to the
bidders’ reports Ri. In our experiments, we set c = 2.
Ideally, we would like to choose c as large as possible to
ensure that the best NN FCs actually overlap with the best
FCs of vˆi, however, there is a trade-off between the num-
ber of samples (and also running time) required by the
compressive sensing method and the size of the support
superset. We did not optimize this hyperparameter.
• Best FT3 and FT4 FCs: for the FT3 and FT4 we use a
heuristic based on the triangular inequality to select the
best FCs and their locations (see Section C.2). As nei-
ther FT3 nor FT4 are orthogonal or satisfy the restricted
isometry property required by the compressive sensing
method, we only take the best `3 locations of NN FCs,
i.e., |Si| = `3.
Notice that the goal of Procedure 3 is solely to determine a
set of bundles Si ⊆ X that is likely to contain many of the
dominant FCs of vˆi. This set Si is then used to determine
reconstructing queries S˜i.
Determining reconstruction queries
Procedure 4. (FOURIER RECONSTRUCTION QUERIES)
i. FT3 and FT4: use the sampling theorems by Pu¨schel and
Wendler (2020) to determine queries for the bidders, i.e.,
bundles S˜i ⊆ X , that enable a reconstruction of v˜i.
ii. WHT: use the same queries as for FT4.
We make use of the sampling theorems for FT3 and FT4
presented by Pu¨schel and Wendler (2020) to obtain recon-
struction queries, i.e., queries that help obtaining a small
reconstruction error ‖vˆi − v˜i‖2. Our rationale here is that
the queries given by the sampling theorem S˜i would lead
to ‖vˆi − v˜i‖2 = 0 for supp(φvˆi) = Si. The sampling the-
orem by Pu¨schel and Wendler (2020) selects rows S˜i such
that F−1S˜i,Si is of full rank, because then (iff supp(φvˆi) = Si)
the Fourier coefficients φvˆi|Si are the solution of the linear
system of equations vˆi|S˜i = F
−1
S˜i,Siφvˆi|Si . In particular, the
theorem yields
• FT3: S˜i = Si,
• FT4: S˜i = {1m − y : y ∈ Si}.
For the WHT there is no sampling theorem. However, we
use
S˜i = {1m − y : |φNi(y)| is in the `3 largest in Si}
as a heuristic to obtain reconstruction queries. Choosing S˜i
in that way empirically often leads to a full-rank submatrix
F−1S˜i,Z of the inverse WHT obtained by selecting the rows in-
dexed by S˜i and the columns indexed by Z , where Z ⊆ Si
are the locations of the `3 in absolute value largest FCs in
Si, i.e., Z := {y : |φNi(y)| is in the `3 largest in Si}. If
F−1S˜i,Z is full rank and supp(φvˆi) = Z , the Fourier coeffi-
cients φvˆi|Z are the solution of the linear system of equations
vˆi|S˜i = F
−1
S˜i,Zφvˆi|Z .
Fitting the Fourier-sparse approximations
Procedure 5. (FIT FOURIER-SPARSE v˜i TO REPORTS)
i. FT3 and FT4: solve the least squares problem defined by
the best FCs and reports Ri.
ii. WHT: use the compressive sensing method by Stobbe and
Krause (2012) defined by the best FCs and reports Ri.
Lastly, we need to fit our Fourier-sparse approximations
v˜i with supp(φv˜i) = Si to the elicited reports Ri :={(
x(l), vˆi(x
(l))
)}
. That is, we determine values w ∈ R|Si|
for the FCs of the Fourier-sparse approximation v˜i =
F−1·,Siw.
• WHT: as already mentioned, for the WHT this is done
using the compressive sensing method by Stobbe and
Krause (2012).
• FT3 and FT4: for FT3 and FT4 we cannot use the com-
pressive sensing method and instead solve the following
least squares problem
min
w∈R`3
∑
(x,vˆi(x))∈Ri
vˆi(x)− (F−1·,Siw) (x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=v˜i(x)

2
.
In Figure 3, we present a flow diagram of the different
algorithms we use in HYBRID ICA.
D.2 Details of Experiments
In Figures 4–5, we present detailed efficiency results of HY-
BRID ICA in all three SATS domains, where we used the
best found configuration of hyperparameters from Table 4.
In the upper plot we show in each figure the efficiency of
the different phases of HYBRID ICA.8 In the lower plot, we
present a histogram of the final efficiency distribution over
100 (in GSVM and LSVM) and 30 (in MRVM) new CA
instances.
NNs Architecture FT `1 `2 `3 `4
GSVM R:[32, 32] | N:[10, 10] WHT 30 21 20 29
LSVM R:[32, 32] | N:[10, 10, 10] WHT 30 30 10 30
MRVM L,R,N:[16, 16] FT4 30 220 100 150
Table 4: Best configuration of HYBRID ICA.
GSVM (Figure 4) We again reprint the efficiency results
of the different paths of HYBRID ICA for GSVM, which
is discussed in detail in the main paper. Furthermore, we
present in the lower plot a histogram of the final efficiency
distribution. We see, that for 65 out of 100 instances HY-
BRID ICA impressively achieves an economic efficiency of
100% using in total only 100 value queries per bidder.
LSVM (Figure 5) Starting with `1 = 30 random initial
queries, HYBRID ICA achieves an average efficiency of ap-
proximately 62%. Next, HYBRID ICA performs 5 MLCA
iterations. After these 5 MLCA iterations, HYBRID ICA al-
ready found for each of the 100 instances an allocation with
an efficiency of at least 80% with an average efficiency of
98%. Here, in the non-sparse LSVM domain, the Fourier
reconstruction and allocation queries can only slightly in-
crease the efficiency of some outliers arriving at an aver-
age efficiency of 98.47%. In the histogram, we see, that for
58 instances, HYBRID ICA was able to achieve full effi-
ciency. Overall, we observe, that in the non-sparse LSVM
the Fourier-based approach is not as effective as in the sparse
GSVM, but still leads to results, that statistically match the
efficiency of MLCA (see Table 3 in the main paper).
MRVM (Figure 6) Starting with `1 = 30 random ini-
tial queries, HYBRID ICA achieves an average efficiency
of approximately 50%. Next, HYBRID ICA performs 55
MLCA iterations and asks in total 220 MLCA allocation
queries. Here, we observe a steep increase in efficiency at
the beginning. In later iterations the increase in efficiency
gets smaller resulting in an average efficiency of 94.34%. In
MRVM, we do not observe an increase in efficiency using
the `3 = 100 Fourier-based reconstruction queries. How-
ever, the `4 = 150 Fourier-based allocation queries signif-
icantly increase the efficiency further by 1.38% resulting in
an final average efficiency of 95.72%.
8In MRVM we abbreviate the different query types as follows:
RI=random initial queries, 1-55=MLCA iterations, FR=Fourier re-
construction queries, FA=Fourier allocation queries.
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Figure 3: Overview of Fourier Transform-based Procedures in HYBRID ICA.
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Figure 4: Details of HYBRID ICA in GSVM.
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Figure 5: Details of HYBRID ICA in LSVM.
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Figure 6: Details of HYBRID ICA in MRVM.
